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Introduction
In the war' against al Qaeda and other terrorists, 2 unmanned aerial
vehicles (drones) have increasingly become the United States' weapon of
choice. 3 In addition to the publicly acknowledged military drone pro-
grams in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA4 uses drones to target militants in
the mountainous Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan
along the Afghanistan border. 5 Initiated during the second Bush adminis-
tration, the CIA's drone program in Pakistan has expanded considerably
since President Obama took office,6 and 2010 saw more than twice as
many drone strikes on Pakistani soil as 20097. The Pakistani government
has publicly denounced the attacks, but its intelligence service is cooperat-
ing with the CIA, and has even selected some of the targets.8 Drones have
an obvious appeal in the United States national security community
because they are effective, while posing minimal threats to American mili-
1. This Note does not use the term Global War on Terror, both because the Obama
administration abandoned it, and because it is vague.
2. The complex relationships among al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the
Afghan Taliban are beyond the scope of this note. For the sake of convenience, my anal-
ysis aggregates all Islamic extremist fighters, actually working together or claiming to be
part of the same overall (though broadly defined) "war" against America. I use the terms
"al Qaeda," "militants," "fighters," and other general terms in reference to this broad
group of persons. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats
and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 429 (2010).
3. Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009. This note relies
significantly on Jane Mayer's article, which, at the time of writing, is widely cited by
both law review articles and other media sources. While various news outlets report on
individual strikes, the Mayer article seems to be regarded as a major authority on the
basics and background of the CIA's drone program in Pakistan.
4. Officially, the CIA neither confirms nor denies the existence of the drone pro-
gram. See id. Moreover, CIA agents, rather than military personnel, conduct the strikes,
raising additional issues that are beyond the scope of this note.
5. Id.
6. Mark Mazzetti & Soud Mekhennet, Drones Kill Westerners in Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A13.
7. Associated Press, Pakistan: Suspected U.S. Drone Strike Against Taliban Kills 18,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/27/paki-
stan-us-drone-strike-taliban.
8. See David Ignatius, A Quiet Deal with Pakistan, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2008), http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/03/AR2008110302638.
html.
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tary personnel. Under international law, however, drone strikes against al
Qaeda militants in Pakistan present a number of challenges.
The CIA's use of drones in Pakistan has become an increasingly cen-
tral topic9 in the ongoing international legal discourse about the United
States' use of force against al Qaeda and other terrorists. 10
Scholars have raised a number of arguments for the illegality of Ameri-
can drone strikes in Pakistan. First, terrorism is a law enforcement issue
rather than a military matter." Second, drone attacks violate the territo-
rial sovereignty of Pakistan, a nation that is not involved in an "armed con-
flict" with the United States. 12 Moreover, the attacks do not meet the
requirements for self-defense under the United Nations Charter (Char-
ter)13 as interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)' 4 and cus-
tomary international law 1 5 . Similarly, the drone attacks violate the jus ad
bellum requirements of necessity and proportionality, to which a State's
initial use of force must conform. 16 Under the Charter, acts of violence
carried out by non-state actors such as al Qaeda cannot constitute "armed
attack[s]" triggering a State's right of self-defense, and hostilities between
the United States and al Qaeda do not rise to the level of an "armed con-
flict."' 17 Moreover, al Qaeda is actually a network of separate, loosely affili-
ated entities, and it does not make sense to characterize every act of
violence carried out in the name of al Qaeda as actually the work of a
single, well-defined organization. 18 Finally, even if an armed conflict does
exist, the drone strikes fail the jus in bello requirements of distinction and
proportionality which govern hostilities once an armed conflict exists. 9
9. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Answers to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 5127 (2010) (arguing, before his death, that it would be illegal under international
law for the United States to kill Osama Bin Laden using a drone in Pakistan); Sikander
Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legal-
ity of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77 (2010) (argu-
ing that CIA drone strikes in Pakistan are illegal under international law).
10. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational Asymmet-
ric Warfare, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339 (2010); Peyton Cook, Bringing the Spies in
From the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence Under the Laws of War, 44 U.S.F. L.
REV. 601 (2010); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article
51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HAR. INT'L LJ. 41.
11. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009 (Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 09-43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing, inter alia, that cur-
rent international law unambiguously prohibits the United States' drone attacks in Paki-
stan, even with the consent of the Pakistani government).
12. Shah, supra note 9, at 119 (arguing that drone attacks amount to "armed attacks
on Pakistan" for purposes of international law).
13. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51; 2(4).
14. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.Cj. 94, para. 176 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
15. See Shah, supra note 9, at 122-23.
16. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 13.
17. Id. "Armed attack" and "armed conflict" are separate concepts. The former
refers to specific acts of violence (see infra Part II.B while the latter is a classification of
hostilities (see infra Part I.F).
18. See Waxman, supra note 2.
19. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 21-23.
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Others argue that the American drone strikes in Pakistan are permissi-
ble,20 or at least that certain existing legal models are inadequate to regu-
late American engagement with al Qaeda in that country21 . First,
prolonged, intense hostilities involving non-state actors that are capable of
conducting large-scale strikes, merit military, rather than law-enforcement
responses. 2 2 American drone strikes also do not violate Pakistani sover-
eignty because Pakistan is unable or unwilling to prevent al Qaeda fighters
from hiding and planning future attacks within its borders. 23 Moreover,
because of past attacks and the ongoing threat of future al Qaeda attacks,
the United States' use of self-defensive force is permissible under Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, and satisfies the necessity and proportionality require-
ments of jus ad bellum. Given its capability and organization, al Qaeda is
capable of "armed attacks" triggering the United States' right to use self-
defensive force under the Charter.24 The acts of persons funded, sup-
ported, trained, or even inspired by the core group of fighters directly
linked to Osama bin Laden should be considered acts of al Qaeda, particu-
larly when that group takes credit for the attacks. Finally, the drone strikes
satisfy the jus in bello requirements of distinction and proportionality.
Assuming the President has authorized it, the CIA's drone program is
most likely legal under American law based on the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force 25 passed by Congress immediately after September
11, 2001, as well as the National Security Act of 194726. Without explic-
itly acknowledging the drone strikes in Pakistan, the Obama administra-
tion has argued that targeted killings of terrorists comply with
international law.27 Some have also argued that targeted killing violates
the domestic ban on assassinations. The ban, however, defines that term
very narrowly, and targeted killings of military leaders have always been
permissible during armed conflict. In any case, the compelling national
security interests and the drones' effectiveness to date make it hard to imag-
ine that the United States will discontinue drone strikes against al Qaeda
fighters in Pakistan. Thus, the question becomes whether the program is
legal under international law, and if not, why not.
20. SeeJordanJ. Paust, Self-Defensive Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility
of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PL'Y 237 (2010).
21. See Roy S. Sch6ndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal
Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'tL LAw & POL. 1 (2004) (considering the shortcomings of
existing international law for accommodating terrorism).
22. See generally id.
23. See Paust, supra note 20, at 249-50.
24. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.CJ. 337, para. 12 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge
Simma) [hereinafter Armed Activities] (criticizing the majority's failure to address
States' right of self-defense against non-state actors, and arguing that States have that
right); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1136 (6th ed. 2008) .
25. SJ. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 413b.
27. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dept., Speech at Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm).
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This Note considers some of the unresolved legal questions surround-
ing the United States' drone program in Pakistan; it argues that the pro-
gram is legal in general; and it identifies some of the challenges to the case-
by-case legality of individual drone strikes. It will argue that international
law supports the intuitive sense that drone strikes killing only known al
Qaeda fighters in Pakistan should be permissible, but that such operations
become increasingly legally problematic as the number of civilian casual-
ties increases. Moreover, the strikes are ad bellum permissible because they
constitute a justified use of self-defensive force against al Qaeda under Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter. Because hostilities between the United States
and al Qaeda constitute an armed conflict, International Humanitarian
Law permits targeted killing of persons actively participating in hostilities.
Thus, the legality of the drone campaign must be determined on an indi-
vidual basis, depending on each strike's adherence to the in bello require-
ments of distinction and proportionality.
Part I provides background on the CIA's use of predator drones to
target terrorists in Pakistan and describes the facts relevant to the present
analysis. Part II argues that the campaign as a whole is permissible as a
result of Pakistan's failure to prevent al Qaeda operations within its bor-
ders. Part III considers the drones' compliance with in bello requirements,
but concludes that a thorough assessment is impossible given the limited
availability of facts. Part VI considers the drones' compliance with in bello
requirements, but concludes that a thorough assessment is impossible
given the limited availability of facts. Part VII presents a comparison
between the law applicable to the drone program and that of espionage, an
area of international law fraught with ambiguities and paradoxes of its
own.
I. Factual Background
Certain legally salient facts define the scope of this note's analysis.
A. Pakistan-Specific Facts
The United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan,
and has Pakistan's permission to conduct drone attacks within its bor-
ders.28 While the Pakistani intelligence and military services have not
always cooperated with the United States' efforts to capture or kill al Qaeda
members, 29 Pakistani leaders now have a say in targeting decisions30 .
Unfortunately, Pakistani government's inability to control the FATA region
28. See Mayer supra note 3.
29. Karin Brulliard & Karen DeYoung, U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation Has Led to Capture
of Afghan Taliban Insurgents, WASH. POST (Feb.19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/18/AR2010021800434.html?sid=ST201002160
6198.
30. Ignatius, supra note 8.
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has allowed al Qaeda fighters to seek refuge there. 3 1 The lawlessness of the
region has allowed agents of al Qaeda to train, plan, and attempt substan-
tial attacks against the United States, as well as its citizens, diplomats, and
military personnel around the world.32 In particular, fighters attacking
American military personnel in Afghanistan are able to avoid capture by
fleeing across the border into Pakistan. 3 3
B. Al Qaeda-Specific Facts
Al Qaeda is distinguishable from past non-state actors to which the
laws of war have been readily applied. Groups like the Tamil Tigers and the
Irish Republican Army have used terror as a tactic, but they differ from al
Qaeda in several key ways.3 4 First, unlike al Qaeda, they have concrete,
identifiable objectives of autonomy and statehood, and their use of terrorist
tactics, while violating international law, is clearly part of their pursuit of
these goals.35 Though al Qaeda certainly has identifiable objectives, its
goals are broad, general, and potentially varied among the different groups
acting in its name.3 6 Thus, the militants' goals differ from the specific
objectives of liberation or separatist armies. 3 7
More importantly, while non-state actors such as separatist groups
might violate the laws of war in pursuit of their objectives, they do not
categorically repudiate the principles on which those laws are based. 38
Upon achieving independence, a new Tamil state, for example, would pre-
sumably seek to join the international community. Such groups, in other
words, violate international law without rejecting its premises as a matter
of principle.39 Al Qaeda, on the other hand, does not want to join the
international community, and generally rejects the norms on which the
laws of war are based. 40 Finally, attacks by al Qaeda and affiliated mili-
tants have left thousands dead and show no signs of stopping.
31. Jackie Northam, Pakistan's Tribal Areas Provide Haven for Militants, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=101880
188.
32. See Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. TIMES, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned aerial-vehicles/
index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Predator Drones and UAVs].
33. See Northam, supra note 31.
34. Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV.
443, 468-69 (2007).
35. Id.
36. For example, al Qaeda's goals have included the end of American influence in
Muslim countries and the establishment of a single Islamic leadership in place of certain
existing secular governments. See Quick Guide: Al-Qaeda: Goals, BBC NEWS, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/04/worldal_qaeda/html/2.stm (last visited Oct. 3,
2011) [hereinafter Al Qaeda Goals]; see generally MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATE-
MENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (Bruce Lawrence, ed., 2005) [hereinafter MESSAGES TO THE
WORLD].
37. Sloane, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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C. The Drone Strikes Themselves
Despite CIA secrecy and Pakistan's prohibition on foreign journalists,
much is known about the program. 41 The CIA makes targeting decisions
based on intelligence from local informants, and the President approves at
least some of the individual strikes.4 2 While the informants are not always
reliable, the CIA goes to great lengths to confirm its information and to
ensure that the strikes specifically target al Qaeda fighters. 43
"Pilots" in the United States control the drones using joysticks while
watching a live video feed from a powerful on-board camera. 44 Accord-
ingly, an obvious advantage of the program is the lack of risk to an on-
board pilot. On the other hand, critics argue that removing the risk elimi-
nates a natural check on commanders' decisions to attack, making the
decision to use deadly force "easier."45
CIA Director Leon Panetta has described the drones as "very pre-
cise .... very limited in terms of collateral damage," and "the only game in
town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leader-
ship."'4 6 According to one comprehensive study, drone strikes in Pakistan
since 2004 have killed between 1,359 and 2,171 people, 1,082 to 1,736 of
whom were militants.47 Thus, the study puts the "non-militant fatality
rate" since 2004 at roughly 21%, and only 6% in 2010. 4 8 A number of
factors contribute to the drones' accidental killing of non-militants. First,
while the drone strikes target specific persons, they depend on intelligence
that may not be reliable.4 9 Moreover, militants take refuge among civilians,
making it difficult to avoid civilian causalities.
11. The Campaign as a Whole is Permissible
The United States' drone strikes in Pakistan are, in general, permissi-
ble under international law, but more serious legal issues arise on a strike-
by-strike basis. In particular, the campaign does not violate Pakistani sov-
ereignty, and constitutes lawful self-defensive force in response to armed
attacks and threats from al Qaeda. Consequently, because hostilities
41. See Mayer supra note 3; see also Predator Drones and UAVs, supra note 32.
42. See Mayer supra note 3.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Peter Singer, online seminar, International Humanitarian Law Research Initia-
tive, Harvard University, Dec. 17, 2009, audio recording available at http://ihl.ihl
research. org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pagelD=2113.
46. Ken Dilanian, Panetta says CIA Operations in Pakistan Taking 'Serious Toll' on al
Qaeda's Operations, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.latimes.com/sc-dc-1020-
drones-20 1010 19,0,665425 7.story.
47. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of the
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, NEw AMERICA FOUNDATION (Fed. 24, 2010)
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergen
tiedemann2.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Mayer supra note 3.
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between the United States and al Qaeda constitute an armed conflict,
targeted killing is permissible under International Humanitarian Law.
A. The Strikes Do Not Violate Pakistani Sovereignty
A state is required to prevent extra-state forces, which engage in hos-
tile acts towards other states, from operating within its borders.50 In par-
ticular, the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) has said
that "every state has the duty to refrain from ... acquiescing in activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when
such acts involve a threat or use of force."'51 Moreover, as UN Special Rap-
porteur Philip Alston has explained: "A targeted killing conducted by one
State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State's
sovereignty [where] ... the first, targeting State has a right under interna-
tional law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter,
[and] the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against
the first State launched from its territory."52
Here, the United States is conducting drone strikes in Pakistan with
that country's permission. 53 Even without Pakistan's permission, however,
targeted drone killings would not constitute an improper violation of Pakis-
tani sovereignty. Because of Pakistan's failure to prevent al Qaeda from
operating within its borders, Pakistan "may not oppose its sovereign rights
to any foreign State that intends lawfully to use force against" al Qaeda.5 4
Indeed, Pakistan's failure to prevent militants' operation within Pakistani
borders is evidenced by the fighters' ongoing activity and the number of
high-level commanders still functioning in Pakistan.55 Moreover, the
strikes against al Qaeda are the kind of lawful self-defensive efforts identi-
fied by Special Rapporteur Alston and, therefore, do not violate Pakistani
sovereignty. 5 6
B. Jus ad Bellum
1. The Strikes Satisfy Article 51 and Jus ad Bellum Necessity
As a general matter, the U.N. Charter forbids the use of force except in
very narrow circumstances.5 7 Specifically, the Charter makes an excep-
tion to this general prohibition by guaranteeing States "the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations."5 8 The ICJ has also recognized that a
50. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 712, 729 (1958).
51. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508 (Mar. 31, 1992).
52. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, para. 29, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston Report].
53. Ignatius, supra note 8.
54. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 (2d ed. 2005).
55. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 7.
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
58. Id. art. 51.
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State's right to self-defense is inherent under customary international
law,5 9 and that States that have been victims of an armed attack may
respond with force that is "proportional to the armed attack and necessary
to respond to it."'60 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ drew a distinction
between "mere frontier incidents" and "grave forms of the use of force,"
noting that only the latter trigger a State's right to use self-defensive force
under the Charter. 6 1 Later, in the Oil Platforms case, the Court noted that
"the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play
the 'inherent right of self-defense.' "62 Although the Court ultimately found
the evidence insufficient to conclude that Iran actually carried out the
bombing in that case, the majority opinion made it clear that an individual
act of violence is sufficient to constitute an armed attack. 63
Some argue that armed attacks giving rise to the right of self-defense
are limited to "massive armed aggression" that "imperils ... life or govern-
ment,"6 4 and that individual acts of minor hostility do not, even in the
aggregate, constitute an "armed attack" under the Charter.65 Thus, the
argument contends that al Qaeda's campaign against the United States
does not trigger the right of self-defensive force under Article 51 because al
Qaeda has not launched a full-scale military offensive. 6 6 The majority
opinion in the Nicaragua case suggests a similarly high bar.6 7
As Robert Sloane has pointed out, however, the problem with such an
overly demanding standard for an armed attack is that "states which suffer
attacks that fall short of the [Nicaragua majority's] 'armed attack' thresh-
old must, in its view, simply endure low-intensity violence, even in the face
of a paralyzed Security Council that proves consistently unable to respond
as the Charter presupposes. '68 Antonio Cassese explains that "self-defence
must cease as soon as its purpose ... has been achieved," but otherwise,
"self-defence may continue until the [Security Council] has taken effective
action rendering armed force by the victim unnecessary.' '69 Presently, the
Security Council has not acted to address the ongoing threat to the United
States from militants located in Pakistan.
Moreover, beyond "mere frontier incidents,"70 violence by al-Qaeda
and associated fighters has lasted since at least 1992 and left thousands
dead in several different countries. The ongoing threat from al Qaeda is
underscored by al Qaeda's emphasis on the fact that all Americans are
59. The Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) Case, 2003 I.CJ. 189, para. 57 (Nov. 6) [herein-
after Oil Platforms].
60. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 94.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Oil Platforms, supra note 59, at 195.
63. Id. at 195-96.
64. CASSESE, supra note 54, at 354.
65. Alston Report, supra note 52, at para. 41.
66. Shah, supra note 9, at 94.
67. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 93.
68. Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L LAw 47, 82 (2010).
69. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2001).
70. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 93.
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targets. 7 1 Assuming that al Qaeda's goals survive the death of Osama bin
Laden, al Qaeda holds American people complicit in the actions of their
government, and regards those actions as justification for the armed
attacks that bin Laden called "defensive jihad. ' 72
2. The Drone Strikes May Satisfy Jus ad Bellum Proportionality, but the
Unavailability of Facts Precludes a Legal Conclusion
Underjus ad bellum, the initial use of force must also be proportionate
to the campaign's objective. 73 "Jus ad bellum must be applied contextu-
ally" to determine whether the overall goal of a use of force, such as the
isolation and incapacitation of the Iraqi regime during Operation Desert
Storm, is a proportionate objective.74 For example, Sloane has argued that
the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan would not have been a proportion-
ate objective for the United States in response to al Qaeda's attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, but a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan was "overwhelmingly
regarded as lawful as evidenced by the response of the Security Council,
regional organizations, and many foreign states" after September . lth.7
5
There is no specific formula, and the inquiry is highly fact-specific.
Because of the secret nature of the CIA's drone strikes in Pakistan, the
Obama administration has not identified their overall objective. 76 The fact
that the drone strikes continue to target specific individual fighters (rather
than, say, entire villages), however, suggests that their goal is limited to the
elimination of ongoing threats to the United States. Such a goal would be
ad bellum proportionate, but the unavailability of relevant facts precludes a
conclusive legal analysis.
C. The Drone Strikes Constitute Lawful Self-Defensive Force Against al
Qaeda, A Non-State Actor
Some commentators argue that the United States' use of force against
al Qaeda is impermissible because only armed attacks by state actors trig-
ger the right to use self-defensive force. 7 7 Indeed, the ICJ's recent jurispru-
dence limits the concept of Article 51 armed attacks to the actions of state
actors.78 This reading of Article 51, however, contradicts the provision's
71. See MESSAGES TO THE WORLD, supra note 36, at 140. Bin Laden also said, "The
American People should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they
voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel,
which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a com-
mittee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American
government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is
committing against Muslims." Id at 140-41.
72. Id.
73. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 93.
74. Sloane, supra note 68, at 69.
75. Id. at 68-70.
76. Mayer, supra note 3.
77. Shah, supra note 9, at 93.
78. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.CJ. 207, para. 139 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall]; Nicaragua, supra note
14, at 103.
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plain meaning and drafting history, as well as customary international
legal paradigms.
Al Qaeda's activities, of course, are not attributable to Pakistan even if
Pakistan's intelligence service has turned a blind eye toward their opera-
tion.79 Thus, the drone strikes against al Qaeda in Pakistan are only per-
missible as self-defensive force against a non-state actor. While the ICJ has
famously held that acts constituting armed attacks must be "by or on
behalf of a state,"80 this reading of Article 51, is neither natural nor
realistic.
Read naturally, Article 51 permits the use of self-defensive force in
response to hostilities by non-state actors. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that treaties "shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty."8 1 Read alongside Article 2(4)'s general prohibition on the use of
force by "Members," against "any State," Article 5 I's conspicuous omission
of a State actor requirement confirms that the Charter itself contains no
such limitation.8 2 Indeed, writing separately in the Wall case, Judge Hig-
gins sharply criticized the majority's purportedly textualist reading of Arti-
cle 51, saying "there is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that
thus stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is
made by a State."8 3 Article 51 is, therefore, unambiguous by its terms.
The Charter's travaux prepartois suggests a similar reading,84 and at
least three recent ICJ judges have questioned whether armed attacks are
limited to State actors. While considering the Charter's accommodation of
regional security agreements, such as the Rio Treaty, the delegates at San
Francisco in 1945 rejected a version of Article 51 that referred to attacks
carried out "by any State."8 5 Therefore, Article 51's drafting history does
not limit the concept of armed attacks to State actions.
Moreover, ICJ Judges Koojimans, Higgins, and Simma have questioned
or rejected a state actor requirement under Article 51. In an era where non-
state groups project military-scale power, the better view is that non-state
actors, such as al Qaeda, can carry out armed attacks. 8 6 Writing sepa-
rately in the Armed Activities case, Judge Koojimans noted that it is "unrea-
sonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely because
79. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, para. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
80. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 103; see also Wall, supra note 78, at para. 139.
81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also Murphy, supra note 10, at 47.
83. Wall, supra note 78, at para. 33 (separate opinion ofJudge Higgins) (emphasis in
original).
84. See Vienna Convention, supra note 81, at art. 32.
85. RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1940-1945, at 698 (1958).
86. Armed Activities, supra note 24, at 337, para. 12 (separate opinion of Judge
Simma); SHAW, supra note 24, at 1136.
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there is no attacker State."8 7
Like the Charter and its drafting history, customary international law
also supports this definition of an armed attack. The Caroline paradigm,
which is the source of the modern customary understanding of self-
defense,88 permits States to use self-defensive force to repel attacks by non-
state actors. 89 Indeed, the Caroline case itself involved non-state hostili-
ties. 90 Finally, the acquiescence of the international community to the
United States' use of military force in Afghanistan after the attacks of Sep-
tember 11th supports the view that attacks by non-state actors can trigger a
State's right to use self-defensive force.9 1
D. The Drone Campaign Constitutes Lawful Anticipatory Self-Defensive
Force
There is no universal agreement on the legality of anticipatory self-
defense,92 and some argue that the plain meaning of "armed attack" pre-
cludes preemptive force. 93 Others read the United Nations Charter itself to
permit the use self-defensive force against anticipated attacks.94 The ICJ
has noted that Article 51 refers to the "inherent" right of self-defense, and
that the Charter affirms, but does not create it. 9 5 Determining the con-
tours of the right self-defense, then, requires consideration of how the
Charter's drafters understood that right.
96
At the time the Charter was drafted, the well-established, 97 customary
right of self-defense permitted States to use force based on anticipated
threats.98 In fact, the Caroline incident involved the use of force against an
American (civilian) ship in anticipation of its future military contributions
to Canadian rebels' resistance against British rule. 99 Such an anticipatory
right is especially appropriate where attacks have already occurred and the
victim state expects additional offensives from the same source. 10 0 Finally,
state practice and the international support for the American invasion of
87. Armed Activities, supra note 24, at 314, para. 30 (separate opinion of Judge
Koojimans).
88. See SHAW, supra note 24, at 1131.
89. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 82, 82-89
(1938) (quoting 61 Parliamentary Papers (1843); 30 British & Foreign State Papers 193
(1843)); see also Murphy, supra note 10, at 50.
90. Id.
91. See SHAW, supra note 24, at 1136.
92. CASSESE, supra note 54, at 474.
93. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-78
(1963).
94. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1958).
95. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 94.
96. BOWETT, supra note 94, at 182.
97. Id.
98. See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV.
699, 711 n.40 (2005).
99. Id.
100. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Forces, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1638 (1984).
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Afghanistan in 2002 suggest substantial acceptance of such a right.10 1
Thus, the ongoing threat from militants in Pakistan also justifies the
use of anticipatory force against persons planning or working towards
future attacks against the United States.
E. The Drone Strikes Do Not Constitute Acts of Aggression
For many of the same reasons that they are ad bellum appropriate,
American drone strikes in Pakistan do not constitute acts of aggression.
The International Criminal Court recently defined aggression as the "use
of armed force by one State against another State without the justification
of self-defense or authorization by the Security Council." 10 2 That defini-
tion essentially restated the General Assembly's widely accepted articula-
tion in Resolution 3314.103 Empowered by the UN Charter, 10 4 the
Security Council determines the existence of any act of aggression, 10 5 and
the ICJ has never formally determined the existence of an act of
aggression. 106
The drone campaign does not constitute an act of aggression because
the strikes are lawfully self-defensive. 10 7 Resolution 3314's drafting his-
tory, however, further undermines the suggestion that American drone
strikes against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan constitute acts of aggression.
Resolution 3314 identifies acts of aggression depending, inter alia, on their
"consequences" and "gravity," along with "other relevant circum-
stances."' 1 8 In negotiating the language of Resolution 3314, the delegates
replaced the Six Power Draft's explicit intent requirement with the more
general consideration of "other relevant circumstances" as a compromise
between those who favored a robust intent requirement and those who
fiercely opposed it. 10 9 Thus, the phrase "other relevant circumstances"
should be understood to make a State's intention relevant, but not neces-
sary to the identification of an act of aggression. 110 Here, the United
States' narrow intention to defend itself, evidenced by the proportionate
and targeted nature of the strikes, further undermines a finding that the
drone program qualifies as aggression under Resolution 3314.
101. See CASSESE, supra note 54, at 476.
102. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, The Crime of Aggression,
Annex I, art. 8, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (advance version June 28, 2010).
103. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) [herein-
after G.A. Res. 3314].
104. MichaelJ. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 71,
108-109 (2010).
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; see also Glennon, supra note 104, at 108.
106. Glennon, supra note 104, at 108. In Armed Activities, the Court declined to adju-
dicate the Democratic Republic of the Congo's specific allegation of aggression despite
holding that Uganda was guilty of a "grave violation" of Article 2(4) of the Charter.
Armed Activities, supra note 24, at 180, para. 23.
107. See supra Part I.A-D.
108. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 103.
109. JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO
AGGRESSION 44 (1977).
110. Id. at 46-50.
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F. Hostilities Between the United States and al Qaeda Constitute an
Armed Conflict
The permissibility of targeted killings depends on the lex specialis
applicable to a particular conflict, which, in turn, must be classified based
on the nature of the violence and the parties involved."' States may con-
duct targeted killings under International Humanitarian Law applicable in
the context of an "armed conflict."112 Neither the relevant Geneva Conven-
tion nor the additional Protocols define an "armed conflict;" 113 the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), however,
articulated what is now considered the authoritative 1 4 test in Tadic'1i ,
and further developed it in Boskoski, where it determined that fighting
between Macedonian security forces and the Albanian National Liberation
Army constituted an armed conflict. 1 16 The test consists of two prongs:
(1) the intensity of the conflict, and (2) the organization of the parties
thereto. 1 17 In addition, the Boskoski court laid out factors relevant to the
satisfaction of each prong in a lengthy opinion that sheds light on the
highly fact-specific nature of the inquiry, particularly where one of the par-
ties is a non-state actor. 1 8 Under the Boskoski analysis, fighting between al
Qaeda and the United States constitutes an armed conflict, permitting the
United States to conduct targeted killings of al Qaeda fighters. 119
1. American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Satisfy the Boskoski Test
a) Drone strikes satisfy the intensity prong
One factor in the Boskoski court's evaluation of the conflict was the
number of casualties. 120 The ICTY noted that the highest total estimate for
the entire period at issue was 168,121 a tiny fraction of the total number of
Americans that al Qaeda has killed.
The Boskoski analysis of the intensity prong also considered how the
Macedonian government treated the hostilities. 122 For example, the court
111. Alston Report, supra note 52, at para. 28.
112. Id.
113. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II].
114. See SHAW, supra note 24, at 1190.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic].
116. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, at 78-93 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Boskoski].
117. Id.
118. Id. at 132.
119. Alston Report, supra note 52, at 28.
120. Id. at 113.
121. Id. at 113.
122. Id. at 113-14.
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noted that the President's orders during the relevant period were issued
pursuant to his Constitutional power as commander in chief.123 The gov-
ernment also instructed personnel to engage in combat activities only per-
missible in a "conditions of war situation," while army and police forces
were instructed to use tactics "beyond the legal regulations applicable in
peacetime." 124 While not dispositive, the government's assessment and
treatment of the situation was highly significant. 12 5 In this case, the U.S.
government has obvious incentives to treat hostilities with al Qaeda as a
war, and clearly such treatment should not be dispositive. The American
government's response to the danger posed by al Qaeda, however, is evi-
dence of its highly informed perception of that threat, and the Obama
administration clearly perceives the threat to be significant.
Hostilities between the United States and al Qaeda, then, are suffi-
ciently intense to constitute an armed conflict.
b) Drone Strikes Satisfy the Organization Prong
The Boskoski court's analysis under the organization prong considered
factors including the armed group's "ability to carry out military opera-
tions,"'126 its "hierarchical command structure,"12 7 and the existence of
corresponding political operations. 128 In the case of al Qaeda, all of these
factors demonstrate that al Qaeda is sufficiently organized to satisfy the
second prong of the Boskoski test.
First, al Qaeda is clearly able to carry out military operations. Some
of the group's notable attacks include: the attack on American military
personnel in Yemen in 1992, the first World Trade Center bombing in
1993, the bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in
1998, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the London bombings in 2005,
and the bombing of the Danish embassy in Pakistan in 2008.129
Second, Al Qaeda has a hierarchical command structure. A former al
Qaeda analyst for the CIA recently described al Qaeda as a group with
"bylaws, committee structures, [and] rules for succession."130 The group's
governance structure also includes regional commanders who operate in
accordance with the "Annual Plan" adopted at the "command council,"
where Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri casted "the deciding
vote[s].' 13 1 In addition, al Qaeda has multiple tiers of management, and
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 125.
127. Id. at 123.
128. Id. at 122.
129. Andrew Wander, A History of Terror: Al Qaeda 1988-2008, OBSERVER, July 13,
2008, at 27, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/13/history.al
qaida.
130. Barbara Sude, Al-Qaeda Central: An Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Terrorist
Group Headquartered on the Afghanistan-Pahistan Border, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, Feb.
2010, at 2, available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAFAl
QaedaCentral.pdf.
131. Id. at 3.
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mid-level officers sometimes move up to replace senior leaders who die in
combat.132
Finally, al Qaeda behaves like a political entity. Before the fall of the
Afghan Taliban, cooperation between al Qaeda and that government was
readily apparent. Moreover, many of the group's stated goals, including the
replacement of certain secular governments with religious leadership, are
political. 133
Therefore, al Qaeda also satisfies the organization prong of the Bos-
koski test.
G. Applicable Treaty Law does not Forbid the Drone Strikes
1. The Drone Strikes do not Violate the Geneva Conventions
Armed conflicts can be international or non-international. 134 Article
2 of Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War limits the Convention's applicability to "armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties," or
"partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting party."'135
Al Qaeda is obviously not a "High Contracting Party," and this case does
not involve occupation, so that Convention does not apply. Similarly,
Additional Protocol I does not apply to non-international armed con-
flicts 1 36 and the other Geneva Conventions are irrelevant, by their terms, to
the present discussion of the legality of drone strikes.' 37 While Protocol 11
can apply to non-international conflicts, it is only applicable where the
non-state actor controls a substantial portion of a State's territory. 138
Therefore, the only applicable Geneva Convention provision is Common
Article 3.
Targeted killing of al Qaeda fighters is permissible under Article 3,
which applies protections to "persons taking no active part in the hostili-
ties, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat. . . -139 The drones do not attack
such persons, instead targeting only al Qaeda fighters, 140 which is permis-
sible during an armed conflict. 141 Targeted killing is an especially appro-
priate technique where one party to the conflict is a non-state group whose
132. Id.
133. See generally MESSAGES TO THE WORLD, supra note 36; see also Al Qaeda Goals,
supra note 36.
134. Alston Report, supra note 52, at para. 50.
135. Geneva IV, supra note 113, at art. 2.
136. See Protocol I, supra note 113.
137. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
138. Protocol II, supra note 113.
139. Geneva IV, supra note 113, at art. 3.
140. See Mayer, supra note 3.
141. Alston Report, supra note 52, at para 30.
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fighters take refuge among civilians. 142
2. The Drone Strikes do not Violate the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
As a general matter, human rights law applies to armed conflicts,
except where International Humanitarian Law (IHL) displaces it as the lex
specialis.143 Here, the United States is a signatory to the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits "arbitrary"
killing even during an armed conflict. 14 4 That prohibition is non-dero-
gable, 145 and the ICCPR also forbids the punitive or deterrent killing of
terrorists 14 6. Far from arbitrary, however, targeted drone strikes against al
Qaeda fighters aim to disrupt future attacks on the United States, rather
than punish or deter militant activity. 14 7 Moreover, it is not clear that the
United States' ICCPR jurisdiction extends to al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan
at all.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has held that "the juris-
dictional competence of a State is primarily territorial," in the context of
human rights treaties, and only applicable extraterritorially in exceptional
cases, such as where the State exercises effective control over territory
outside its borders. 14 8 It is important to distinguish the concept of juris-
diction in human rights treaties, where the term "denote[s] solely a sort of
factual power that a state exercises over persons or territory," from the
more common legal term for the competence of a particular court. 14 9 Arti-
cle 2(1), of the ICCPR obliges the United States to protect the human rights
of persons "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction,"150 and al
Qaeda fighters in Pakistan are clearly not within American territory. While
the Human Rights Committee has read Article 2(1) of the ICCPR disjunc-
tively (as if the "and" were an "or"), so that it actually provides two alterna-
tive bases for jurisdiction, 1 5 1 such a construction is strained. Indeed, the
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, provides for interpretation "in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms"
' 152
and the Convention's interpretive principles reflect customary interna-
142. See infra Part III.C.
143. See Alston Report, supra note 52, at para 29.
144. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(l), Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
145. Id. at art. 4; Alston Report, supra note 52, at para. 37.
146. See Final Observations of the Human Rights Committee Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
CO/78/ISR, Aug. 21, 2003.
147. See supra Part IIB.
148. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) at para. 71.
149. Marko Milanovic, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State
Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411, 417 (2008).
150. ICCPR, supra note 144, at art. 2(1).
151. Draft General Comment on Article 2, The Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, para. 9, CCPR/C/CRP.4/Rev.3 (May 5,
2003).
152. Vienna Convention, supra note 81, at art. 31(1).
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tional law15 3. Reading the "and" in Article 2(1) to mean "or" is obviously a
substantial departure from the language, 15 4 and that provision should
instead be given its "ordinary meaning"'155 . Thus, properly construed, the
jurisdictional provision of the ICCPR does not oblige the United States to
safeguard the rights of al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.
The Human Rights Committee also sought to stretch the concept of
ICCPR jurisdiction in Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, where it read
the provision to include "violations of rights under the Covenant which [a
State's] agents commit upon the territory of another State."' 5 6 This read-
ing, however leads to "a result which is manifestly absurd" by extending a
State's ICCPR obligations universally. 15 7 Interpreting "subject to its juris-
diction" to include any situation where a state's agents affect a person's
ICCPR rights would eliminate the concept of jurisdiction altogether
because a state's human rights obligations are only ever at issue because its
agents have affected a person's rights.15 8
Thus, neither the Geneva Conventions nor the ICCPR prohibit the
United States' drone attacks against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.
It is also worth noting that, beyond refusing to adhere to both IHL,
such as the Geneva Conventions, and human rights law, such as the
ICCPR, al Qaeda completely rejects the premises that underlie those princi-
ples. As one commentator has stated:
The common denominator of the war convention-which, absent reciproc-
ity, repudiation, and other interstate political dynamics, makes it "work,"
however imperfectly-is a shared normative commitment to reducing super-
fluous suffering and harm in war. And the main convention by which IHL
accomplishes this is the axiom of noncombatant immunity, which modern
transnational terrorist networks typified by al Qaeda reject. This "new"
genre of non-state actor also rejects the secular, aspirationally universal con-
ception of human dignity underlying international human rights law.1
5 9
Therefore, to insist that existing international law is perfectly capable of
addressing the challenges posed by such groups, 160 is to ignore the dis-
crepancies between the premises underlying that law and actors' practices
in the real world.
III. Jus in Bello: Strike-by-Strike Legal Analysis Requires More Facts
Because the drone campaign is not unlawful as a whole, the question
becomes whether individual strikes violate international law. Under the
153. Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in Ex-rRATRToRiAL APPLICATION OF HU mAN RIGHTS TREATIES
41, 47 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
154. Id. at 48.
155. Vienna Convention, supra note 81, at art. 31(1).
156. Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, para. 12.3, Communication No. R.12/
52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981).
157. Vienna Convention, supra note 81, at art. 32(b).
158. See McGoldrick, supra note 153, at 45.
159. Sloane, supra note 34, at 468-69.
160. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 11, at 12.
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rules of armed conflict, each drone strike against militants in Pakistan
must conform to jus in bello principles "in consideration of the "delicate
balance to be maintained between military necessity and humanitarian
considerations." 161 The analysis of "proportionality should be a complex
equation, taking into account factors such as the military importance or
exigency of the target." 162 In addition, the core Geneva principle of dis-
tinction is customary international law, and every attack must distinguish
between militants and persons not directly participating in hostilities.
16 3
Whereas jus ad bellum governs the initial resort to the use of force, jus in
bello restricts individual operations. Because the jus in bello inquiry is
highly factual and strike-specific, this note will not reach any conclusions
about the in bello permissibility of the individual drone strikes. What is
clear, however, is that the in bello requirements of proportionality and dis-
tinction represent the most significant hurdles for the legality of American
drone strikes in Pakistan.
A. Proportionality
The holistic, fact-specific nature of the proportionality inquiry is illus-
trated by a report by the Military Advisor to the Secretary General on
Israel's 1996 shelling of a U.N. compound in Qana, Lebanon, which con-
tained 100 civilians seeking shelter. 164 Major General van Kappen's report
was the product of an extensive investigation, including interviews and a
forensic survey of the site, and ultimately concluded that the shelling was
most likely not an accident. 16 5 The report also included many details: the
proximity of the compound to the source of Hezbollah rockets fired at
Israeli soldiers, possible inaccuracies in Israeli maps, the actual landing
sites of Israeli shells, the specific chronology, proper functioning of weap-
ons, and the professionalism employed by the Israeli artillery team. 166 The
proportionality of individual military operations, therefore, involves a
holistic, context-specific analysis.
Here, while the secret nature of the drone strikes and inaccessibility of
the FATA region precludes such a thorough analysis, certain facts remain
salient. First, the entire program's non-militant casualty rate is roughly
21%, though it was only 6% in 2010.167 Drones also show their operators
a "perfect picture" of the target, facilitating adherence to the principle of
161. SHAW, supra note 24, at 1184.
162. W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L LAW 381, 390 (1997).
163. Protocol 1, supra note 113, at arts. 51(4), 52(2); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 L.CJ. 257, paras. 78-79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons];
CASSESE, supra note 54, at 416.
164. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 7, 1996 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, at Annex, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/1996/
337 [hereinafter Qana Report] (containing a "[r]eport dated 1 May 1996 of the Secre-
tary-General's Military Adviser concerning the shelling of the United Nations com-
pound at Qana on 18 April 1996").
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 47.
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distinction. 168 Conversely, an obvious problem with the drone strikes is
their dependence on potentially unreliable intelligence. 169 There is an
obvious risk that a local informant may provide intentionally misleading
information for any number of self-serving purposes. 170
Another pertinent consideration is the relative unavailability of other
means of attacking al Qaeda fighters. The lawless FATA region is difficult
to access, 171 and attempting to actually control the territory through
ground operations could result in even more casualties. Given the diffi-
culty of accomplishing the compelling military objective of killing al Qaeda
fighters, the drone strikes would most likely be in bello proportionate if
they could bring their non-militant casualty rate below some minimum
threshold.
B. Distinction
International law does not forbid civilian casualties, but instead
requires that targeting decisions in individual military operations must
avoid civilian causalities that are excessive in relation to the anticipated
military advantage. 172 Moreover, "laws of armed conflict are clear that an
attacker is not precluded from attacking a legitimate military target by the
proximity of civilians or civilian objects," provided that "weapons [are]
aimed individually."'173 In the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ held that
"weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and mili-
tary targets" are forbidden,174 but declined to hold that nuclear weapons
are per se incapable of distinction 175 . Accordingly, drones cannot be said
to be incapable of adhering to the principle of distinction, and the unfortu-
nate deaths of innocent civilians do not, without more, render the strikes
unlawful. In general, drones are capable of achieving this distinction to the
extent that their targeting decisions rely on intelligence sources that are,
themselves, able to accurately distinguish. Therein, however, lies the
difficulty.
Common Article 3 forbids all murder and requires humane treatment
of non-militants. 176 Persons who are not members of armed groups enjoy
protection from direct attack unless they directly participate in hostili-
ties.177 Regardless of applicable treaty provisions, the principle of distinc-
168. Mayer, supra note 3.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Protocol 1, supra note 113, at art. 51(5)(b); see also SHAw, supra note 24, at 1184.
173. Roy Gutman & Daoud Kuttab, Indiscriminate Attack, in CRIMES OF WAR 195,
195-97 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
174. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 163, at para. 78.
175. Id. at para. 95.
176. Geneva IV, supra note 113, at art. 3(1).
177. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Partic-
ipation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CRoss
991, 995 (2008) ("adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee of the Red
Cross on 26 February 2009") [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance].
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tion is customary international law,178 and only permits targeting of
persons who commit specific acts likely to influence military action 179 .
The International Committee of the Red Cross has also said that civilians
enjoy a presumption of non-militant status, such that commanders may
not target persons whose militant status is ambiguous. 180 Al Qaeda fight-
ers wear no uniforms, do not travel in marked vehicles, or otherwise iden-
tify themselves in such a way as to facilitate distinction. Accordingly,
drone operators must rely on informants to determine the status of a given
target and the number of civilian casualties is indicative of the unreliability
of this intelligence. Moreover, al Qaeda's use of human shielding under-
mines American efforts to distinguish between militants and civilians, fur-
ther complicating the legality of American drone attacks in Pakistan.
C. Human Shielding
Human shielding is a complex issue that bears heavily on the legality
of American drone strikes in Pakistan. When civilians become "involun-
tary" shields because al Qaeda fighters hide among them to deter attacks,
those civilians continue to enjoy protection against direct attack because
they are not participating in hostilities. 18 1 Where civilians who are not
otherwise participating in hostilities locate themselves near, or refuse to
depart from the vicinity of al Qaeda fighters with the intention of deterring
attacks, however, the question becomes more complex. One view holds
that even such intentional interference, by creating legal or moral obstacles
to attack, cannot constitute direct participation in hostilities, such that per-
sons acting as voluntary shields retain immunity from attack. 18 2 The con-
trary position is that where "a voluntary shield takes affirmative steps to
frustrate harm to objects (or persons) that make [a military] contribu-
tion ... he contributes to military action in a direct causal way [and] it is
difficult to style his behavior as anything but direct participation." 1 83 This
latter view is intuitively more compelling where, as here, voluntary human
shielding thwarts defensive military operations. In other words, by inten-
tionally deterring American drone strikes on militants, human shields
affirmatively inhibit operations intended to disrupt al Qaeda attacks on the
United States. Accordingly, voluntary human shielding should be regarded
as direct participation, and those who so contribute to al Qaeda's efforts
should not enjoy immunity from direct attack.
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COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 292, 316-18 (2009).
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D. Jus in Bello: No Easy Answers
The obvious difficulty underlying the jus in bello issues of proportion-
ality, distinction, and human shielding, is that all three inquiries are
extremely fact-specific. In the FATA region, however, facts are difficult to
come by. All three of these issues potentially require consideration of a
potential militant's mental state, which is hard enough to ascertain in a
courtroom with witnesses. Indeed, determining what a person did and
why is a challenge in many branches of the law. Therefore, requiring com-
manders and their lawyers to make such assessments in real time, based on
inferences and questionable intelligence, is a tremendous burden. This
note cannot resolve that difficulty. Hopefully, however, the discussion has
clarified that American drone strikes in Pakistan are generally permissible
under international law, but determining the legality of specific strikes
requires extremely thorough factual analysis.
IV. A Wrinkle: "Mutual-Espionage"
The ambiguities in the law applicable to groups like al Qaeda have a
kind of symmetry with the paradoxical position of intelligence activities in
international law.184 International Humanitarian Law punishes spying
without outlawing it, 1' s and intelligence activity "occupies a very murky
place in international law that might be characterized as either legal but
discouraged, or illegal but not enforced"'186 . A former CIA lawyer has even
suggested that perhaps "espionage and international law cannot be recon-
ciled in a complete synthesis" and, accordingly, that "we should tolerate the
ambiguities and paradoxes inherent in the world's second oldest
profession."' 1
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The international law governing the conflict between al Qaeda and the
United States has paradoxes and ambiguities of its own. For example, al
Qaeda "rejects the secular, aspirationally universal conception of human
dignity underlying international human rights law,"'18 8 yet enjoys certain
universal human rights protections' 8 9 . Similarly, al Qaeda fighters inten-
tionally target civilians as a tactical matter, and hide among civilians to
take advantage of the American desire to adhere to the principle of distinc-
tion. 190 This dissonance is unsettling, but it also evokes the disorder in the
international law of espionage and invites comparison. If the law has, or
does come to rest at a kind of tolerance for the "ambiguities and paradoxes
184. See Cooke, supra note 10.
185. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Pro-
tocols of 8June 1997 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 564 (Yzes Sandoz
et al, eds. 1987) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary].
186. Cooke supra note 10, at 609.
187. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 595, 596-97 (2007).
188. Sloane, supra note 34, at 468-69.
189. See Alston Report, supra note 52.
190. Schmitt, supra note 181, at 319.
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inherent in" espionage, 19 1 perhaps the dissonance itself merits investiga-
tion as part of an effort to resolve counterterrorism's own legal paradoxes.
A. Espionage and International Law
The status of spying in international law is informed by the fact that
states want to engage in the practice while punishing the individuals
caught spying on them. 19 2 The 1977 First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions stated that "[riuses of war are not prohibited" but that
spies do not enjoy prisoner of war status. 19 3 A former lawyer for U.S.
European Command similarly remarked that "the status of espionage
under international law is ambiguous, not specifically permitted or
prohibited."' 1
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Simon Chesterman writes: "Spies, therefore, bear personal liability for
their acts but are not war criminals as such and do not engage the interna-
tional responsibility of the state that sends them ... [resulting in] the nec-
essary hypocrisy of states denouncing the spies of their enemies while
maintaining agents of their own."19 5 Therefore, states gain a kind of
advantage by sending spies rather than soldiers, because individual actors,
rather than governments, bear the risk of operations. 1 96 States engaging in
espionage activities might be said to have it both ways, in that the States
themselves will avoid responsibility, while enjoying the benefits of activities
conducted by their agents. By attacking states but avoiding the accounta-
bility associated with being a state, capable of becoming the target of retali-
ation, al Qaeda also has it both ways.
B. Terrorism and Espionage
Taken to the extreme, the comparison between terrorism and espio-
nage might result in a conceptualization of terrorism as a form of violent
espionage, such that counterterrorism would constitute responsive espio-
nage, which often necessitates violence of its own. Such a conclusion,
however, leads further into the legal void. Instead, because the legal hur-
dles to the legality of drone strikes against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan
involve such fact-specific inquiries, the evolution of the applicable law
should promote transparency. Perhaps, taking a cue from the realism
underlying the international law governing espionage, the law of
counterterrorism should evolve to explicitly permit American drone strikes
against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan. If drone strikes were unambiguously
lawful, they would be easier to monitor, and the principles of proportional-
ity and distinction easier to enforce. Moreover, the United States would
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192. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
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196. See id at 1098.
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have more incentive to adhere to those principles. Although clearly not a
silver bullet, such a theoretical shift might better promote jus in bello's
actual aim: reducing unnecessary suffering.
Conclusion
Ten years after September 11th, it seems almost absurd to argue that
terrorism is a law enforcement matter. The scale, sophistication, and com-
plexity of the al Qaeda threat has long-since evolved into something more
substantial. Perhaps the first step is recognizing that groups like al Qaeda
are really game changers in the world of international law, much like the
internet was a game changer in the world of information and
communication.
Perhaps, by doing what it deems necessary to protect its security inter-
ests, the United States, for better or worse, will alter norms, and customary
international law will change. It seems likely, however, that the United
States, and other countries that are the primary targets of terrorist organi-
zations, will continue to conduct activities like the drone strikes in Paki-
stan to address terrorist threats no matter what. To those who envision a
world in which countries feel bound by international law the same way
individuals feel bound by domestic law, this is a hard conclusion to stom-
ach. But international law regarding the use of force against terrorists can
also conform to reality, rather than the other way around. A framework
that accommodates the security needs of countries targeted by terrorism
would promote the legitimacy of international law by reducing the
instances in which countries are forced to choose between their own secur-
ity needs and compliance with international norms. In the meantime,
States need to defend themselves, and will almost certainly continue to do
so.
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